17 ideas
20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |