23 ideas
16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |