50 ideas
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |