28 ideas
23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |