41 ideas
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
| 17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
| 17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
| 17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
| 17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
| 17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |