35 ideas
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| 11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |