21 ideas
6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |