57 ideas
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |