Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'World and Essence'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
18933 Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
9866 Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato]
5864 Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]