Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Trees, Terms and Truth' and 'Causation and Supervenience'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18915 If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
18919 There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18913 Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18907 Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18912 Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18922 Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
18905 Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18908 Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
18933 Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18916 Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18921 Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
18918 Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18920 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
9866 Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato]
5864 Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8388 Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
8389 Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8393 We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8390 Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8392 Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
8399 The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8391 In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8394 Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
8398 Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]