56 ideas
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |