326 ideas
| 78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
| 5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
| 2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| 103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
| 16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
| 112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
| 16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
| 22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
| 76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
| 4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle] |
| 21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle] |
| 9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
| 35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle] |
| 15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
| 10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
| 8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
| 9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
| 9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
| 15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
| 15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
| 9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
| 15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
| 14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
| 15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
| 15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
| 15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
| 16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
| 15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
| 10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
| 15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| 15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
| 15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
| 15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
| 9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
| 16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
| 9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
| 15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
| 15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
| 15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
| 15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle] |
| 27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle] |
| 5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle] |
| 9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
| 13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
| 9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
| 14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
| 9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
| 19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
| 15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
| 15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
| 9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
| 9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
| 16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
| 12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
| 9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
| 15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
| 10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
| 5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
| 5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
| 16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
| 11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
| 15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
| 9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
| 4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
| 2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle] |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
| 22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
| 95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
| 79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
| 16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
| 9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
| 9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
| 9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
| 16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
| 16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
| 5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle] |
| 5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle] |
| 5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle] |
| 5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle] |
| 5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle] |
| 5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle] |
| 8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre] |
| 12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
| 4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle] |
| 20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski] |
| 4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
| 5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
| 4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| 72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
| 8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
| 8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
| 8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
| 8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
| 8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
| 8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
| 8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
| 8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
| 8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
| 16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
| 16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
| 5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle] |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham] |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle] |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle] |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
| 52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
| 46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
| 5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
| 5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
| 31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
| 5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
| 5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
| 5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
| 21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
| 91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle] |
| 88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle] |
| 71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle] |
| 34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
| 4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| 4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
| 58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
| 54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
| 4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| 63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
| 5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| 5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
| 5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| 107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
| 55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
| 5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
| 5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
| 5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
| 4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
| 5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| 5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
| 3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
| 4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
| 5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
| 4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
| 56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
| 5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
| 5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
| 4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
| 5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
| 4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
| 4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| 5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
| 60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
| 47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
| 4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
| 61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
| 4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
| 5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
| 65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
| 5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
| 5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
| 5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
| 3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
| 5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
| 64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
| 4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
| 5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
| 5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
| 5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
| 4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| 23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
| 5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
| 5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
| 5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
| 5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
| 24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
| 5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
| 4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
| 18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
| 5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
| 105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
| 18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
| 110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
| 111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
| 104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
| 5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
| 38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
| 1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
| 108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
| 2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| 2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| 85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
| 5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
| 5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle] |
| 5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle] |
| 5133 | Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle] |
| 86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle] |
| 5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle] |
| 21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle] |
| 5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle] |
| 87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle] |
| 5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle] |
| 5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle] |
| 21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
| 21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel] |
| 5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle] |
| 5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle] |
| 5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle] |
| 2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| 5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
| 5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle] |
| 9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
| 9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
| 24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle] |