17 ideas
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |