Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Dispositions' and 'Elusive Knowledge'

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92 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus]
Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch]
Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus]
What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus]