Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Action' and 'Substance'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
12056 An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12052 We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
12055 Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
12059 A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
12063 Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
12051 If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
12053 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
12054 Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12047 We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
12057 Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
12064 The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
12049 Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
12065 Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]