22 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
| 17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
| 17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
| 17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
| 17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
| 17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
| 17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
| 17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
| 17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
| 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
| 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
| 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
| 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
| 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
| 17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |
| 17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |