Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' and 'The Case against Closure (and reply)'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]