Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Believing the Axioms I' and 'Plural Quantification'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy]
Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy]
Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy]
Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy]
A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]