Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Concepts without Boundaries' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
8983 If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
8986 We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
8982 Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
8984 If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
8985 Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]