Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'Truth by Convention'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]