Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'works' and 'The Scientific Image'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14919 Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6783 To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
14917 To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
6784 Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
13066 An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473 How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]