Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'works'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]