Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Finkish dispositions' and 'Supervenience'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
16039 Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
16043 Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16047 Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16040 Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
16044 Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
16046 Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16049 Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16042 The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]