59 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |