Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation' and 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed)'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]