12 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |