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161 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / c. Later medieval philosophy
Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / d. Renaissance philosophy
After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell]
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell]
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell]
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell]
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell]
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is always something psychological about inference [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell]
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / b. Transubstantiation
Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]