274 ideas
| 15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
| 13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
| 9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
| 8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
| 20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
| 15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
| 9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
| 8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
| 15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
| 15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
| 15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
| 15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
| 13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
| 15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
| 15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
| 15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
| 15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
| 15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
| 15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
| 15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
| 15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
| 15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
| 15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
| 15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
| 9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
| 15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
| 8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
| 16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
| 14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
| 15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
| 15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
| 22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
| 17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
| 15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
| 15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
| 9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
| 8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
| 8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
| 16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
| 9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
| 17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
| 17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
| 10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
| 13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
| 10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
| 10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
| 16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
| 9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
| 7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
| 13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
| 17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
| 17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
| 11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
| 18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
| 18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
| 22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
| 17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
| 11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
| 10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
| 15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
| 15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
| 16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
| 13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
| 13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
| 8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
| 17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
| 11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
| 9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
| 9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
| 7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
| 13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
| 10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
| 10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
| 9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
| 15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
| 8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
| 8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
| 20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
| 20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
| 8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
| 20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
| 17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
| 10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
| 17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
| 15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
| 13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
| 10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
| 10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
| 598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
| 11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
| 12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
| 9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| 1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| 20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
| 517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
| 20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
| 16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
| 1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
| 492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
| 515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
| 8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
| 8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
| 20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
| 8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
| 5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
| 20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
| 20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| 24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| 8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
| 9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| 8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
| 9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
| 9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
| 10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
| 9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
| 10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
| 9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
| 7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
| 15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
| 1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
| 495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
| 1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| 20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| 13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
| 8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
| 20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
| 1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
| 5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| 13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| 20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
| 1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
| 23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
| 8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
| 20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
| 24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| 20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
| 22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
| 8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
| 1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |