109 ideas
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |