45 ideas
6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |