Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Reason' and 'On What Grounds What'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]