12 ideas
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |