59 ideas
| 326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
| 315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
| 7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
| 7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
| 306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
| 7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
| 324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
| 20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
| 7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
| 7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
| 7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
| 7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
| 7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
| 7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
| 7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
| 7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
| 12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
| 307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
| 318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
| 321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| 7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
| 7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
| 7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
| 7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
| 7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
| 7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
| 7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
| 7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
| 7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
| 7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
| 7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
| 7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
| 7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
| 7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
| 7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
| 7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
| 7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
| 7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
| 334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
| 5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
| 7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
| 330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
| 316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
| 328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
| 322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
| 331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
| 310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
| 311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
| 325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
| 327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
| 314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
| 312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
| 309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
| 308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |