Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Infinitism solution to regress problem' and 'Universals'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8833 Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8834 Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8838 If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]