Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Emotions' and 'Parts of Classes'

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70 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie]
Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie]
Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie]
A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie]
If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie]
When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie]
It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie]
If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie]
We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie]
An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie]
Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie]
Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie]
Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie]
A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie]
Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie]
We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie]
Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie]
Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie]
Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie]
We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie]
Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie]