11 ideas
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |