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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Moral Problem' and 'Begriffsschrift'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22270 Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
8939 We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
4971 I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
17745 For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
7728 Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner]
16881 The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
7622 In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7729 Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9950 A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
9991 For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait]
10536 Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
7730 Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner]
7742 Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
13824 Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
13609 Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
17855 It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10607 Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
11008 Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
22280 Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
7741 The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner]