12 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |