Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' and 'Reference and Modality'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]