20 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |