33 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |