Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Words without Objects' and 'The Question of Ontology'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
12215 The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
12211 It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
12209 The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
12212 Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216 Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
12218 Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]