38 ideas
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| 12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
| 12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| 12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
| 12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
| 12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
| 12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
| 12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
| 12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
| 12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
| 12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
| 12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
| 12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
| 12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
| 12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |