27 ideas
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |