36 ideas
| 21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
| 21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
| 21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
| 21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
| 21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
| 21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
| 21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
| 21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
| 21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
| 21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
| 21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
| 14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
| 7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
| 7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
| 7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
| 7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
| 7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
| 7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
| 7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
| 7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
| 7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
| 7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
| 7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
| 7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
| 7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
| 7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
| 7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
| 7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
| 7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
| 7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |