Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'My Philosophical Development' and 'Philebus'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]