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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Denoting' and 'Modality'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
11006 Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5750 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
5737 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5744 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
18944 Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7758 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
5772 The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
18941 Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
4945 Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
18942 Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
7745 Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
10449 Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
15159 The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
2612 Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
7757 "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18943 Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
6411 Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
10433 Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
11009 Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
1608 The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
7754 Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
21529 Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
6333 The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
6412 Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
7743 Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
7310 Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
12006 Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
4569 Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
21549 The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
12796 Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
7532 Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
11988 Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
6061 Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
5736 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
5735 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
18775 Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
7533 The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
6063 Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
5746 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
5738 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
5732 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5739 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
5751 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4567 Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
5810 Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
5774 Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
5775 In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
16385 A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16987 By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4570 Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16349 Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
7313 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7767 The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21726 In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
5773 The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]