32 ideas
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |