13 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |