Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Natural Minds' and 'Value Theory'

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21 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6375 The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
6381 The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
6378 Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6380 Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
6379 A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
6377 Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]